21691

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 250

5 April 1950

SUBJECT:

Potentialities for Anti-Soviet Underground Resistance in the

Event of War in 1950.

REFERENCES:

THE PROBLEM

- To identify, with respect to certain countries of Europe, the Near East, and the Far East, those elements of the population sufficiently hostile toward the USSR to constitute a potential for organized anti-Soviet underground resistance in the event of the outbreak of war in 1950 and during the course of ensuing military operations as envisaged in ARCI 15.
- To estimate the ability of the USSR to control these elements in the event of war as envisaged in ABCI 15.
- 3. To estimate the nature and extent of the anti-Soviet action which it would be possible for underground resistance movements recruited from these elements to accomplish in the circumstances assumed in ABCI 15, either with or without prior US direction and aid.

#### **DISCUSSION**

4. For discussion of the subject with reference to specific regions and countries see:

Enclosure A - The USSR

Enclosure B - Eastern Europe

Enclosure C - Northern Europe

Enclosure D - Western Europe


Enclosure E - The Near East

Enclosure F - Northeast Asia

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- 1. There is already in existence in the USSR widespread latent disaffection which could be exploited in time of war. If the elaborate Soviet police and security control system could be disrupted and if Western support were immediately at hand, an underground resistance movement could hamper Soviet war mobilization and in time bring about a crippling disintegration of the Soviet war effort. The main areas of potential resistance are the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Soviet Central Asia.
- 2. In Yugoslavia, the Tito regime probably would try to maintain an armed neutrality but would conduct an extensive campaign of guerrilla warfare if attacked.
- 3. In the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, spontaneous, uncoordinated resistance demonstrations are likely to appear in the early stages of a war, but these would be short-lived. The potential for a substantial resistance movement, capable of planned sabotage and guerrilla warfare, could be developed in Poland, and, on a smaller scale, in Slovakia and Albania.
- 4. Finland, Turkey, and Greece offer a considerable potential for underground resistance. In most other countries in the rest of Europe and in the Near East, resistance efforts, if any, would be limited and largely uncoordinated, at least until the prospect of liberation seemed close at hand. A resistance potential exists in Northeast Asia, but the maximum effort to be expected is unlikely to interfere with Soviet offensive operations in other areas.
- 5. The USSR can control the subversive efforts that are likely to arise in any single region of potential underground resistance. A systematic campaign of resistance activities in a number of areas, particularly in the Soviet Satellite area or the USSR itself, would seriously impede and harass Soviet military operations. Only full-scale insurrection in extensive areas of the USSR would cripple the Soviet war effort.
- 6. In every area prior US direction and aid would greatly increase the effectiveness of anti-Soviet underground activities. In most areas, in fact, prior US direction and aid would be essential to the organization of any effective underground efforts.





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THE USSR

## 1. Sources of Disaffection in the USSR.

Three principal bases of potential disaffection exist in the USSR;

a. General disillusionment and resentment as a result of the exactions, repressions, and personal insecurity characteristic of the Soviet state.

b. The peasants' intense resentment of collectivization, which caused large groups of the rural population to support the invading German Army in anticipation that Germany would abolish the collective farms and distribute the land on a basis of private ownership.

c. The hostility of minority nationalities toward Great Russian demination.

# 2. Main Areas of Potential Disaffection.

The main areas of potential disaffection are the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Soviet Central Asia.

a. The Baltic States: Strong anti-Soviet feeling is prevalent among Baltic nationals in general. While the MVD apparently has the area as a whole under control at present, there was substantial active resistance effort in the Baltic States in 1945-46, and some partisan activity may still continue. In the event of war, the Baltic nationals, as distinct from transplanted Russians, would be a serious menace to Soviet security. Their hope of regaining national independence would be stimulated by even a distant prospect of Soviet defeat. Many Baltic nationals would engage in underground resistance, despite intensive Soviet police surveillance, particularly if US aid were available.

b. Byelorussia: The situation in Byelorussia is generally stable except for areas incorporated from Poland. The MVD presumably has the widespread disaffection under control, but a limited active resistance effort might be organized with US aid.

- c. The Ukraine: Although forced emigration has eliminated many of the Ukrainians who actively collaborated with the Nazis, and disaffection appears to be under control, Ukrainian nationalism is still a security problem in the USSR, especially in the newly ammand western areas of the Ukraine. In the event of war, the Ukraine probably would not support the Soviet war effort without coercion. If the Ukraine should in time be invaded, the population would welcome the invader, and a substantial underground movement probably could be built up in anticipation of liberation if US aid were available.
- d. The Caucasus: Like the Ukraine, the Caucasus has been a troublespot for the USSR. The ethnic groups that were disaffected in World
  War II have been forcibly removed from the area, but the profusion of
  ethnic peoples and tribes, particularly the minorities less privileged
  than the Georgians, Azerbaijani, and Armenians, are a potential for an
  active underground resistance effort.
- e. Central Asia: A serious rebellion occurred in Central Asia in the early 1930's, and there are indications that since then the USSR has taken special security measures in this area. Many political dissidents were exiled to this area from European Russia. The local population is predominantly Moslem and probably is unsympathetic to Communism. While specific information on disaffection is presently unavailable, Central Asia probably contains a substantial resistance potential, which could be developed if US direction and aid could establish contact with disaffected elements despite close police surveillance.
- f. The Soviet Far East: This area is the base of a separate military command, which controls the principal communication centers and routes, and there is no known potential for underground resistance except the great concentrations of forced labor camps, which are isolated and completely controlled by the MVD.

# 3. Resistance Potential.

These potential sources of disaffection normally are kept under effective control through isolation of the Soviet people, internal propaganda, economic coercion, Communist monopoly of political power, and, above all, police terrorism. However, the unrepresentative character of the government, its high degree of centralization, and its ultimate dependence on police coercion are specific weaknesses of the Soviet system. If the mechanism of close police control were broken, disintegration would set in.



So long as Soviet military operations appeared to be meeting with complete success and the internal security mechanism remained intact, no serious hindrance to the Soviet war effort would result from the latent disaffection within the USSR. If Soviet internal propaganda were disproved by events (especially if Allied capabilities proved greater than expected, and Soviet capabilities less), Soviet morale would be adversely affected and resistance movements would become sufficiently active to hamper war mobilization. The effect would not be decisive, in the sense of bringing about a crippling disintegration of the Soviet war effort, unless the Soviet security control mechanism were thoroughly disrupted and effective Allied support of disaffected groups were immediately at hand.

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EMCLOSURE B

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(Yugoslavia and the European Satellite States)

## l. Yu-oslavia.

Assuming that the present Yugoslav regime remained in power, the outbreak of war between the USSR and the West would confront it with a serious dilemma. On balance, it appears that Yugoslavia would endeavor to maintain an armed neutrality. If Yugoslav territory were invaded by Soviet or Satellite forces, the regime would resist with determination.

In these circumstances the Yugoslav armed forces could not expect to hold the more open parts of the country, which are, in general, the Danube plain and the main routes from it to Trieste and Salonika. Yugoslav strategy probably contemplates no more than delaying action in these areas, designed only to cover a withdrawal into the mountains, where a stout partisan resistance could be maintained. This withdrawal would clear the lines of communications essential to the broader purposes of Soviet strategy, but, in view of continuing Yugoslav resistance, large Soviet security forces would be required for the protection of these lines of communication. If Soviet forces went into the mountains after Tito, as might be deemed necessary for political as well as military reasons, an extraordinarily large diversion of Soviet strength would be required. Even if organized Yugoslav forces were finally isolated and destroyed, a large and active underground movement would be formed from the remnants to harass and sabotage the occupation wherever possible.

Inasmuch as the majority of the Yugoslav people are anti-Communist as well as anti-Soviet, some of them might take advantage of the disruption of political control to repudiate and attack Tito, thus dividing and weakening Yugoslav resistance. Only a very few crypto-Stalinists, however, would be likely to collaborate with the invader. In the national crisis, most non-Communist Yugoslavs would probably be disposed to accept Tito's leadership for patriotic reasons.

The existing regime would regard as subversive any US effort to develop potential resistance in Yugoslavia apart from general aid rendered to the regime itself. In the event of Soviet invasion, Tito would, of course, call for moral and material support.

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# 2. The European Satellite States.

The Communist governments of the Satellite States would of necessity support the USSR. The Satellite armed forces, however, would be unreliable. Wholesale defection probably would not occur in the early phases of the war, but the utility of the Satellite troops would be strictly limited.

The vast majority of the people of the Satellite States are thoroughly disaffected toward the USSR and the Communist regimes imposed on them. They would welcome war in the hope of eventual liberation. The outbreak of hostilities would probably occasion sporadic acts of open resistance, which would be ruthlessly suppressed by the local Communist regimes and the USSR. Continuing active resistance would be mainly clandestine, consisting in sabotage, espionage, and acts of terrorism. More substantial resistance, including organized guerrilla warfare, would be likely to spring up in Poland, Slovakia, and Albania.

This situation would be radically altered if the USSR were to appear to be losing the war and if advancing Western forces were in a position to render effective support to popular resistance in the Satellite States. The Satellite armed forces, as well as many rank-and-file Satellite Communists, would then become increasingly unreliable, and the resistance would develop into full-scale popular insurrections wherever there was prospect of Western support and comparatively early liberation. In some circumstances, crypto-nationalist elements in Satellite governments might attempt to assume at least a Titoist character, but the probability is that, in the face of a rising tide of patriotic reaction, most Satellite officials would perceive no future for themselves apart from the fortunes of the USSR.

Although spontaneous resistance is to be expected in the Satellite States, it could be rendered effective enough to impede and in some cases to imperil Soviet military operations only if there were prior and continuing US direction and aid.

# a. Poland, Slovakia, and Albania.

Between a quarter-million and a half-million Poles might actively resist Soviet occupation in time of war. Many of them would have had practical experience in the anti-German underground, in which nearly a million Poles were participating toward the end of World War II. Members and leaders would come mainly from the officer corps of the old Polish Army, former nationalist parties and patriotic organizations, the former Socialist party, and the Catholic clergy. This large underground would interfere with Russian military operations in and across Poland by cutting lines of communication, making armed attacks on Soviet personnel, destroying war material and installations, and transmitting intelligence on Soviet dispositions and installations. Polish resistance would be spontaneous be-

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cause of strongly anti-Soviet national feeling, but US aid would increase the effectiveness of the underground activity, especially if the Poles were assured by the US that Germany would not be allowed to regain its former mastern territory.

Clandestine anti-Soviet resistance groups, organized on a local basis, are already in existence in Czechoslovakia, mainly in the mountainous region of Slovakia. With prior US direction and aid, an underground effort capable of concerted sabotage of war industries on a limited scale and harassing attacks on Soviet communications could be developed. While the Czech peoples of Western Czechoslovakia are more passive, the conservative Catholic political groups in the mountainous regions of Slovakia probably would be able to organize a base for underground activities, diverting a considerably number of Soviet and Czech Communist security forces for some time.

Because of the comparatively exposed position in Albania, its rugged terrain, and the militant character of the population, the USSR is unlikely to be able to control the whole country. The population is overwhelmingly anti-Communist and as a consequence anti-Soviet. With US direction and aid, active bands numbering as many as 25,000-30,000 could be organized and used in guerrilla warfare and subversive operations aimed at the occupation authorities.

# b. Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Eastern Germany.

In Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, as well as in Eastern Germany—which is being treated virtually as another Satellite State—popular hostility to the USSR would result in spontaneous acts of sabotage and, possibly, in the formation of small underground groups with strictly limited resistance capabilities. Prior US aid and the prospect of comparatively early liberation would be necessary to convert these groups into an organized underground movement even on a small scale. For the most part resistance in these countries would consist of non-cooperation rather than active subversion.



#### NORTHERN EUROPE

(Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark)


## 1. General.

In all four countries of Northern Europe the population in general would be hostile to Soviet military occupation. In Finland and Norway there is at present a strong potential for organized and effective underground resistance. A resistance potential is being developed in Sweden. The possibilities in Demmark are very limited.

#### 2. Finland.

The Finns have demonstrated their firm will to regist domination. That the experience of having been overpowered in 1940 and again in 1944 has not weakened their determination is indicated by their bold and stubborn, although discreet, resistance to Soviet political pressures in the postuar period. In the event of war, the USSR presumably would try to gain the uncontested admission of Soviet troops into Finland by invoking the mutual assistance treaty imposed on Finland under Soviet pressure. The Finnish Government, however, would make every effort to forestall the entrance of Soviet troops into Finland, and the Finnish armed forces would resist their unauthorized entrance. In any event, Soviet military operations in Finland would be conducted in hostile territory. If Soviet forces were present with consent wrung from the Finnish Government under duress, resistance would come from underground elements operating with the surreptitious connivance of the Finnish police and armed forces. If the Soviet occupation came about entirely by force of arms, these underground elements would be reinforced by the active perticipation of whatever remnants of the armed forces and police were left at the end of organized hostilities.

Apart from the armed forces and police, the main elements of systematic resistance would be the members of the Social Democratic Party and the veterans of three previous wars with the USSR. The Social Democratic Party not only has an extensive political network and trade union organization, but also an effective anti-Communist counterintelligence system. The veterans organizations, including some 250,000 men fit for guerrilla action, have ostensibly been disbanded, but covert organizations exist. With the cooperation of the army, these organizations have cached small arms and laid plans for guerrilla resistance.



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This resistance, drawing support from most non-Communist Finns, would occur without prior US aid. It would be rendered more effective by strategic direction and by moral and material support. Even so, it could not prevent Soviet occupation of Finland, but the USSR would be compelled to maintain sizable occupation forces there, and the underground would seriously harass and impede Soviet military operations in or through that country.

# 3. Norway.

Norwegian military commanders are under instructions to continue a guerrilla resistance wherever circumstances prevent effective frontal defense. Moreover, the Norwegian population contains the nucleus and leadership of an experienced underground resistance movement in the 30,000 Norwegians (excluding Communists) who participated in such World War II resistance activities as clandestine communication of intelligence and sabotage of shipping, transportation, or industrial production. A skeleton organization left over from the World War II effort is now active. Considerably more than 30,000 Norwegians would be disposed to participate in resistance against Soviet occupation.

Such resistance would occur without prior US aid. The previous success of Norwegian underground resistance, however, depended in large measure on the training of personnel in the UK and their introduction into Norway for the accomplishment of specific missions. The effectiveness of resistance against the USSR would be greatly enhanced by prior organization and preparations for similar aid, as well as by the continuing provision of strategic direction and of moral and material support after hostilities had begun.

Such resistance would not render Norway untenable, but would impose on the USSR a requirement for sizable occupation forces and would seriously harass and impede Soviet military operations in and from Norway.

#### 4. Sweden.

The Swedish armed forces and civil population would be willing to resist Soviet invasion and occupation, but Sweden has not experienced combat since 1815 and has not undergone hostile occupation for more than four centuries. The initial shortcomings of Swedish resistance would be attributable to lack of a tradition and practical experience rather than lack of will to resist.


Nevertheless, a potential exists for developing effective underground and guerrilla resistance in Sweden. In particular, considerable reserves of manpower well trained in small unit operations are available



(which is not the case in Norway and Denmark). Developing this potential for Swedish resistance by prior organization and planning is apparently precluded by the government's devotion to traditional Swedish neutrality. The Swedish military authorities, however, take a different view of the situation, and, according to current reports, are preparing for continuing guerrilla and underground resistance after frontal defense has been broken.

#### 5. Denmark.

The Danish population would be generally hostile to Soviet occupation, but the possibility of active resistance would be severely limited by the small area and open terrain of the country. With prior US aid, an organization capable of effective espionage and sabotage might be established. Without such aid, Danish resistance would be likely to consist only of limited random acts of sabotage and espionage.



#### WESTERN EUROPE

(Western Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Austria, Italy, and Trieste)

#### l. General.

The majority of the population in all the countries of Western Europe is anti-Communist and would be hostile to Soviet military occupation. Although there are variations from country to country, there is an over-all Western European potential capable of supporting a limited underground resistance effort. It would derive its strength mainly from official police and state-security forces, religious organizations, and—to a lesser extent—militant elements of the anti-Communist political parties.

## 2. Security Organizations.

Police, gendarmeric counter-intelligence, and other paramilitary organisations in all Western European countries have made sufficient progress toward weeding out their postwar Communist elements to constitute a source of reliable members for an anti-Soviet underground. US aid and guidance could be proffered only through official channels and would have to be harmonized with current plans by the various national governments for the employment of these organizations. The main sources of trained resistance personnel would be in the following organizations: the French Republican Guard, Gendarmerie, and police; the Italian Carabinieri and Security Police; the West German zonal police forces, Border Police, and British Zone Constabulary; the Netherlands police and National Reserve; the Belgian police and Gendarmerie and training.

# 3. Religious Organizations.

The Catholic Church, along with the Protestant church organizations in the Netherlands, constitutes the largest confirmed anti-Communist group in Western Europe. These religious groups are relatively secure from Communist penetration and possess closely knit organizations. Their membership, their organizations, and their well established chains of communication would contribute greatly to a potential underground. Their

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
long-range outlook would provide the patience necessary to begin the organization of a permanent anti-Communist undergound. This long-range outlook, however, wo ld tend to limit resistance activity in the early stages of the war, restricting it for the most part to being a good source of clandestine intelligence.

# 4. Political Party Organizations.

Socialist, Catholic, and other rightist political parties in Western Europe, especially in France, West Germany, and Italy, would form the nucleus or (more probably) several independent nuclei for an anti-Soviet resistance movement during the later stage of Soviet occupation. Socialists in West Germany and Austria already have clandestine anti-Soviet organizations. These could be developed into resistance movements if their membership were purged of Communists who infiltrated in early postwar "cooperation " campaigns. In France, de Gaulle's Rally of the French People is reported to have set up and trained a private paramilitary protective force of approximately thirty thousand men to combat militant action by the French Communist Party. In Italy, similarly, there are fragments of several groups of anti-Communists formed at the time of the 1947-48 election crisis to guard against a possible Communist coup d'etat. These forces included the "Osoppo" Division, the action committees of the Christian Democrat, Monarchist, and Liberal Parties, and the Catholic Action groups. These Italian groups probably would not play a very active resistance role in the early stages of the war, even with US aid and direction, but would provide a nucleus for an underground.

# 5. Miscellaneous Sources of Underground Members.

Fragments of the Western regular military forces, especially in Italy where partisan bands have proved effective in the past, could, if brought under unified control and given prior US guidance and aid, make a useful addition to the ranks of any clandestine force. Individual members of various associations of veterans of World War II would join any organized resistance movement in considerable numbers and would provide exceptionally well-informed, vigorous leadership, particularly those with experience in French and Italian guerrilla fighting in World War II. Finally, the resistance movement would draw many members from the anti-Communist trade unions, especially those in France, Italy, Austria, and West Germany. Special precautions in screening volunteers would be necessary because many of the trade unions have been penetrated by Communists.





## 6. Soviet Controls.

Soviet controls would be adequate to prevent underground activity from materially interfering with the progress of Soviet military operations during the combat and initial occupation phase of the war. These controls would be ruthless if military security required a firm repressive policy. The occupation would work through surviving local Communists employed as informants and auxiliary occupation officials in all the Western European countries. Considerable intelligence concerning potential resistance leaders has already been transmitted to Moscow through Communist channels.

## 7. Potential Strength of the Resistance.

In the absence of prior US aid and direction, local efforts toward resistance would consist mainly of uncoordinated, "one shot" sabotage operations ending in liquidation of the responsible underground organizations. With prior US aid and direction, underground resistance units would be able to execute sabotage of selected targets on a limited scale and to set up contact and escape routes to Western bases. In the initial phase of the war, intelligence concerning enemy dispositions and actions would be the main benefit deriving to the West from the underground effort. The vigor and enterprise of the resistance, as well as progress toward organization of a permanent, large-scale underground movement, would depend less on the national and organizational character of the various underground movements than on the estimate of Western Europeans generally as to the remoteness of liberation and the severity of Soviet repression.



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NEAR EAST

(Turkey, Greece, Iran, Israel, and the Arab States)


## 1. General.

In the Near East the potential for an active anti-Soviet resistance exists in Turkey and, to a more limited extent, in Greece. There is in Iran a resistance potential that might be developed if the political structure of the country should withstand the shock of impending Soviet attack. Insignificant resistance can be expected throughout the Arab States. Israel if the Israeli definitely threw in their lot with the West, as they probably would, small but spirited and experienced underground groups could be organized.

## 2. Turkey.

There is in Turkey the potential for an effective resistance movement, strongly backed by the great majority of a determined population inflexibly opposed to foreign domination. The resistance forces would be formed primarily from the large number of regular and reserve military personnel who have received US training and equipment. The movement would be augmented by individual Turks from nearly all classes of the population, which has a strong military tradition and would vigorously support the resistance. The country's mountainous terrain and the vulnerability of transportation routes to sabotage insure the possiblity of an extensive harassing campaign. Such a campaign, provided the local tribes (especially the Kurds) did not mount an effective counter-campaign against the Turks, would divert substantial numbers of Soviet troops.

Without continuing US aid, the underground effort would be seriously impaired by shortages of military supplies and lack of outside moral support, but the underground would remain active as long as there was hope of eventual liberation. Prior moral support, direction, and aid by the US, particularly in the form of equipment and gold for conducting subversive operations and procuring local supplies, would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the resistance effort. The main operations would be guerrilla warfare and systematic sabotage of Soviet communications.





#### Greece.

The Greek urge for independence, animating perhaps as much as 90 percent of the population with deep resentment against Soviet designs on Greece, would provide the basis for an active resistance movement. It would draw its membership mainly from Greek military personnel, government officials, and the many victims of recent Communist guerrilla campaigns. The leadership probably would come from military officers experienced in working under US guidance and with US equipment. It would take more than 100,000 Soviet occupation forces to control the country and even then the mountainous districts would provide cover for bases for which organized sabotage could be carried on.


Prior US direction and aid would be essential to effective guerrilla action and the sabotage of the vulnerable main lines of Soviet communications. Otherwise, the assistance which the Greek Communist Party could give the Soviet authorities in eliminating resistance leaders and groups gradually would reduce the underground to uncoordinated and largely ineffective activity.

#### 4. Iran.

Units of the Iranian Army, plus various tribal groups, would constitute the main elements of a resistance movement that would be fairly active if the shaky political structure of the country held together in the period of impending Soviet attack. If the underground were organized before the outbreak of hostilities, it would be capable of impeding the advance of Soviet forces by demolitions along lines of communications, interfering with Soviet military supply in general, and hampering the use of Iran's petroleum and shipping facilities in particular. Major guerrilla operations would take place in the rugged sections of western and suuthwestern Iran. Soviet control would not be impaired in the Persian Gulf region, the focal point of Soviet interest in Iran.

In addition to the army, the resistance forces would be drawn from certain tribal groups, in northwestern Iran (Shahsevan), in western Iran (certain Kurdish tribes), and in southwestern Iran (Qashqai, certain Lur, Bakhtiari, and Arab tribes).

Soviet rule would be rather ineffective in those sections of Iran where the terrain is rugged, and bases for active tribal resistance efforts could be developed.



Failing US support (now being given to the Iranian Government and its organized defense forces), any Iranian underground would suffer from poor morale, lack of equipment, and lack of competent direction.

5. Arab States (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia).

With the possible exception of the Assyrians of Northern Iraq and bedouin tribesmen of the desert throughout the Arab region, there is hardly any potential for anti-Soviet resistance in the Arab states. The USSR would have little difficulty in maintaining complete control of all areas essential to the conduct of Soviet military operations in the Near East. With prior US direction, accompanied by lavish subsidies, Assyrian and bedouin irregular forces could be formed for "hit-and-run" raids against Soviet communications, but these would have only nuisance value. Without outside assistance there would be no useful resistance.

#### 6. Israel.

The Israeli are thoroughly experienced in underground activities, including the organization and employment of illegal paramilitary units for sabotage and terror-attacks on occupation authorities. They constitute a potential for a small anti-Soviet resistance movement, provided the Israeli in general identified their hope for independence with ultimate Western victory, as they probably would in the event of Soviet attack and occupation.



NORTHEAST ASIA

(China, Korea)

## 1. General.

In the event of war in 1950 the Chinese Communist regime would be a reliable ally of the USSR, declaring war on the Western Powers when and if Soviet strategic policy required such action. Thus the USSR would have effective military control of Manchuria and access to the manpower, military bases, and other resources of China. The USSR would have quickly overrun and occupy all of Korea. There are some potential resistance elements in Northeast Asia, and a resistance effort in Southern Korea could be organized if prior and continuing US aid and direction were made available. It is assumed, however, that Soviet military strategy in the Far East would be fundamentally defensive in event of war in 1950. In this case the maximum resistance effort possible in the early phases of the war would only harass the occupation forces and could not impede Soviet operations in Europe and the Near East.

#### 2. China.

Despite the fact that a co-belligerent China might be a strategic liability, whereas a non-belligerent China would cover an extensive Soviet front, the USSR probably would demand a declaration of war by the Peiping regime as a categorical proof of loyalty. In this event, the effectiveness of Chinese support to the military operations of the USSR would be limited. Discontent would spread among the Chinese as a result of conviction that China had become involved in war at the behast of the USSR. The combination of war-weariness and anti-foreign sentiment would provide a psychological basis for the development of underground resistance. The resistance groups probably would be formed from scattered remnants of ex-Nationalist units, some small anti-Communist guerrilla units still in existence, mercenary and bandit groups, and — conceivably but not very probably in the early stages of a war — disaffected elements of the Chinese Communist field forces.





#### 3. Korea.

Most Koreans in both zones are intense nationalists and, except for the small Communist minority, would be hostile to Soviet occupation in the event of war in 1950; only special groups, however, would constitute a potential for anti-Soviet action. The strongest potential for active resistance exists in southern Korea, particularly among rightist Korean youth groups and among the US-trained and equipped Korean National Police and the Army, numbering more than 100,000. Leadership for an underground resistance movement would come from the above groups and from officials of the southern Republic.

With prior US direction and aid, and given a pledge of eventual liberation and independence, a Korean resistance movement could supply intelligence on Soviet dispositions and installations; engage in guerrilla warfare against communication lines, railroads, and possibly small Soviet and Korean Communist military units; and encourage hostility and passive resistance to the Soviet occupation among the general population, particularly the peasantry. Under these circumstances the resulting unrest would require the commitment of substantial Soviet forces in Korea to maintain internal security. Without prior US direction and aid, the resistance effort would be confined to minor, sporadic, and uncoordinated acts of violence or sabotage. The USSR could eliminate any large concentrations of guerrilla forces and prevent major acts of sabotage on communications or industrial installations, but could not prevent minor harassing actions, the collection of intelligence, or the maintenance of sea communications by the resistance with US forces in Japan.